Unfair Competition -- Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina by Tyser, Wallace C., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 4 Article 5
6-1-1968
Unfair Competition -- Law of Unfair Competition
in North Carolina
Wallace C. Tyser Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wallace C. Tyser Jr., Unfair Competition -- Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 856 (1968).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss4/5
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
women who had never been pregnant. In practice, this was done. The
fourth health department differed from the first three only in two re-
spects. Although the department itself did not offer birth control
programs, the county commissioners, by contract with a local hospital,
did maintain a birth control clinic in which public health personnel
were active. The second difference was that this clinic offered birth
control only to women who either had a child or were married. All de-
partments had eligibility tests for free services, ranging from certifica-
tion of indigency by the local welfare department, to a sliding income
scale set by the county commissioners, health and welfare departments,
and local civil rights organizations.
Unfair Competition-Law of Unfair Competition in
North Carolina
INTRODUCTION
Competition as the generating force of our economy has been
protected by two bodies of legal prohibitions: (1) the Sherman
Act,' the Clayton Act,2 the Federal Trade Commission Act,8 and
state regulation of monopolies and restraints of trade,4 having as
their goal the prohibition of conduct which unreasonably suppresses
or substantially lessens competition, and (2) legal controls which
attempt to maintain a level of competition so that competitors
measure up to notions of "fair play."' Although neither grouping
is totally exclusive of the other since conduct which is unfair can
also tend to lessen competition,6 the dichotomy can be justified on
the ground that the former treats of broader public interests while
the latter-termed the law of unfair competition-deals primarily
with conflicting interests between business competitors.
There is no precise definition of the term "unfair competition." 7
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
838 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -16 (1965).
See S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 1 (1965).
8 Court interpretation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
has read "unfair methods of competition" to include antitrust violations, e.g.,
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
'See 1 H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
§ 1 at 14-15 (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as NIMs]. Other general
references in the area of unfair competition include R. CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (2d ed. 1950) [herein-
after cited as CALLMANN] and W. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION
AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936).
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Most courts and legislatures have admitted this by phrasing the
concept in broad elastic language.' For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has termed it as "that which a court of equity would
consider unfair."'  The concept had its origins in the sense of
justice of the common law judges.1" As with other common law
torts, it is an evolutionary concept, the limits of which are still in
dispute. While at first the courts only protected the plaintiff when-
ever the defendant attempted to "pass off" on the public his goods
as those of the plaintiff, later protection prohibited the defendant
from taking advantage of something which the plaintiff created,
whether or not the defendant was passing off or confusing the public
as to the source of the goods." Unfair competition law has tradi-
tionally been justified on grounds that it maintains a level of honesty
and fair dealing between competitors, protects the purchasing public
by preventing a defendant from creating confusion, and protects
the individual competitor's rights and interests."2
Specifically, unfair competition has been interpreted to mean
infringement of trademarks and trade names, imitation of appear-
ance and dress of the competitor's product, appropriation of values
(e.g., trade secrets) created by the competitor, deceptive advertising,
and disparagement of the competitor's product, title or business
methods.' 3 Of course, there is far from complete agreement that
' Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act merely proscribes
"unfair methods of competition", thus leaving it to the courts to arrive at a
definition on a case by case basis. This approach is analogous to that pre-
vailing at common law in the evolution of the tort of unfair competition.
See FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
' Charcoal Steak House v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 204, 139 S.E.2d 185,
189 (1964), citing Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C. 269,
20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
"10 Nmis § 1 at 2.11See 1 N Ims § 1 at 3.
12 1 Nims § 6 at 36. But Callmann points out that "[b]ecause there is no
clear concept of unfair competition, there is no clear theory of unfair com-
petition." 1 CALLMANN § 4.1 at 71.
" See 1 NIms § 1 at 14-15. -An excellent summary of the concept of un-
fair competition is found in Nims:
It is unfortunate that the body of law termed unfair competition was
christened with that title. It is a misnomer. It is misleading because,
except in those jurisdictions where absence of competition is recognized
as a defense to a charge of unfair competition, these rules cover cases
where there is no competition between the parties. To describe it with
any accuracy is very difficult; for, though the common law of unfair
competition may be a "limited concept," the acts to which these rules
have been found to apply are ever changing in character as social and
business conditions change. It applies to misappropriation as well as mis-
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this listing is either inclusive or exclusive of unfair competition.
For example, one authority contends that disparagement is a concept
still within the law of libel and slander rather than unfair competi-
tion, and that false or misleading advertising has not as yet been
recognized as within the doctrine of unfair competition.14
The scope of this comment will be a consideration of the doctrine
of unfair competition as expressed in court opinions and statutes
in North Carolina.
TRADEMARK AND TRADE NAME INFRINGEMENT
According to most authorities, protection against trademark and
trade name infringement is considered part of the law of unfair
competition and rests more or less on the original concept of "pass-
ing off" around which this tort originally evolved." The basic
assumption is that use by a defendant of a trademark or trade
name which is "confusingly similar" to the plaintiff's trademark
or trade name will confuse the purchasing public as to the source
of the goods,"6 their sponsorship,17 or otherwise dilute the distinc-
representation; to the selling of another's goods as one's own, to misap-
propriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor; to acts which lie
outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted by fraud, coer-
cion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law. Most courts continue to
confine it to acts which result in the passing off of the goods of one man
for those of another, but this limitation is not universally accepted.
1 N ms § 1 at 3.14See 1 CALLMANN § 4.1 at 74.
15 "Trade-mark infringement rests on a relatively narrow principle while
the law of unfair competition is a broad concept with a widening scope.
Trade-mark infringement is a phase of unfair competition, while unfair com-
petition may exist independently of trade-mark infringement." 1 NIMs § 1
at 13. In fact, unfair competition began as a variety of misrepresentation
emerging from trademark and trade name infringement. Originally labeled
nominative torts, the various kinds of misrepresentation eventually blossomed
into the tort of unfair competition, which later was extended beyond mere
"passing off." See S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIc Es 1-5 (1965).
"Confusion as to the source or origin of the product is inclusive of (1)
"confusion of goods," which occurs whenever a purchaser, assuming that
articles with like marks come from the same source, buys one product in the
belief that he was purchasing another and (2) "confusion of business,"
which occurs whenever the purchaser assumes that the product, although dif-
ferent from the plaintiff's, originated with the plaintiff, and thus believes
some connection exists between the plaintiff and the defendant. In both the
plaintiff's good reputation is "at the mercy of the defendant." See 3 CALL-
MANN § 84.1 at 1628-29.
"See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1948), where an injunction was granted plaintiff, publisher of "Seventeen"
magazine, against defendants' use of "Miss Seventeen" on girdles. The
court, holding defendants guilty of unfair competition, said that "the wrong
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tiveness of the plaintiff's name or mark by frequent, though not
immediately confusing, use.18 Protection has been grounded in North
Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, on the rationale usually given
for the general concept of unfair competition: protection of the
plaintiff's property interest in the good will which the name or
mark has built up, prevention of confusion in the interest of the
buying public, and maintenance of competition on a level of honesty
and fair dealing."9 Some courts see trademark and trade name
protection as analogous to patent or monopoly establishment and
are restrictive in their protection.2" Others consider the protection
a necessity for the stimulation of competitive effort.21
For protection, the plaintiff must show that he has a valid trade-
mark or trade name which the courts will protect, that it is used
to identify his goods and distinguish them from others, that "con-
fusing similarity" exists between his mark or name and the de-
fendant's, and that the defendant uses the mark on goods and in a
market such that the plaintiff needs protection.
22
Establishment of a Valid Trademark or Trade Name
"Every manufacturer has the unquestionable right to distinguish
the goods that he manufactures and sells by a peculiar mark or
device, so that they may be known as his in the market, and he
of the defendant consisted in imposing upon the plaintiff a risk that the
defendant's goods would be associated by the public with the plaintiff, and
it can make no difference whether that association is based upon attributing
defendant's goods to plaintiff or to a sponsorship by the latter when it has
been determined that plaintiff had a right to protection of its trade name."
167 F.2d at 973. See also 3 CALLMANN § 84.2 at 1642-46.
"8 The fact that the plaintiff and the defendant are not competitors gives
rise to this separate category; dilution is therefore not "passing off." Two
kinds of non-competitive infringement (dilution) can occur: (1) where the
non-competing goods are so related that one might assume they came from
the same maker or sponsor and (2) where the non-competing goods are
entirely unrelated, thus probably negating any possibility of confusion.
3 CALLMANN § 84.2. Of course, in either category, the parties may be po-
tential competitors. But confusion occurs only when they become actual
competitors. See generally Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 105 (1957).19See e.g., Blackwell v. Wright, 73 N.C. 310 (1875).0See generally Taggart, Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition?, 43
MicE. L. REv. 659 (1945); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Re-
straint of Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 323 (1949); Zlinkoff,
Monopoly versus Competition, 53 YALE L.J. 514 (1944).
" See, generally Leeds, Trademarks from the Government Viewpoint, 44
CALIF. L. REv. 489 (1956); Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Func-
tion of Trade-marks, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PaOB. 173 (1949).
" See 3 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 717 (1938).
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may thus secure the profits which their superior reputation as his
may be the means of gaining."23 But the particular way the product
is distinguished can make a difference in whether or not the plaintiff
has shown a valid mark or name, as well as in the degree of pro-
tection afforded. In the first place, if the manufacturer affixes his
distinguishing mark to the commodity, this makes it a trademark
as distinguished from a trade name.24 But more significantly, if
the manufacturer or plaintiff chooses a word or phrase that is
generic, descriptive, geographical or personal, then for protection
of the word or phrase the plaintiff must show that it has acquired
a "secondary meaning" identifiable with plaintiff's product.25 In
Charcoal Steak House v. Staley26 this distinction between a tech-
nical, arbitrary, or fanciful word or phrase and one which was
generic, descriptive, geographical or personal was pointed out:
At common law generic, or generally descriptive, words and
phrases, as well as geographic designations, may not be appropri-
ated by any business enterprise either as a trade-name or as a
trademark. Such words are the common property and heritage
of all who speak the English language; they are publici jiris ....
Notwithstanding this rule, equity will always protect a business
from unfair competition and the public from imposition ....
When a particular business has used words publici juris for so
long or so exclusively or when it has promoted its product to such
an extent that the words do not register their literal meaning on
the public mind but are instantly associated with one enterprise,
such words have attained a secondary meaning. This is to say,
a secondary meaning exists when, in addition to their literal, or
dictionary, meaning, words connote to the public a product from
a unique source.27
23Blackwell v. Wright, 73 N.C. 310, 312 (1875).2
"See Charcoal Steak House v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 139 S.E.2d 185
(1964); 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 718 (1938).2 See generally 3 CALLMANN §§ 69-74.3(d); 1 NIms §§ 36-37 at 152-60.
28263 N.C. 199, 139 S.E.2d 185 (1964).
2
'Id. at 201-02, 139 S.E.2d at 187. At common law the distinction be-
tween trademarks and trade names was that the former had reference to
the fanciful, arbitrary, unique, distinctive, and nondescriptive while the
latter had reference to the descriptive, generic, personal, corporate, or geo-
graphical. Trademarks were technical; trade names were non-technical.
Today that distinction has disappeared for most purposes, but the basic con-
cept which originated with the distinction remains vital. Thus, if the mark
or name is non-technical, the plaintiff must show that it has acquired secon-
dary meaning in order to have it protected. If it is a technical mark or
name, it is valid per se without any further showing required of the plaintiff.
See 3 CALLMANN § 66.1.
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In the Staley case the court was faced with the question of
whether the words "Charcoal Steak House" were entitled to pro-
tection from "Staley's Charcoal Steak House." Since the plaintiff
had chosen a trade name which was descriptive of any restaurant
specializing in steaks, and therefore non-technical, the plaintiff had
the burden of showing that "Charcoal Steak House" had acquired
a secondary meaning. Taking judicial notice of the frequent and
common usage of "charcoal steak house," the court held that the
plaintiff had failed this burden. In addition, it pointed out that
even if the plaintiff had shown a secondary meaning, all the relief
the plaintiff could expect, since the words were "public" in nature,
was that the defendant so designate his restaurant that "reasonably
intelligent" persons would not be misled. This the defendant had
already done by using the prefix "Staley's." Thus, because the
plaintiff used a non-technical name, his case was harder to maintain
and his relief less than absolute. If the plaintiff had chosen an
arbitrary or technical trade name, he would have been entitled to
an absolute injunction against its use by the defendant.2
Illustrative of the common law approach is Blackwell v. Wright,29
where the court held that the plaintiff's trademark, "genuine Durham
smoking tobacco," was not entitled to protection from "original
Durham smoking tobacco" because "Durham" was the name of a
town and "smoking tobacco" was a term in general use (a generic
term). In Bingham School v. Gray,3" the plaintiff and the defendant
were both descendants from the founder of the first "William Bing-
ham School." Both used this name for their respective schools and
the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from claiming that
its school was a successor to the first school. Although concluding
that each had a right to claim the successorship to the original
school, the court stated the general proposition that one cannot
have the exclusive right to appropriate the use of a surname for
a trademark.3 1
Confusing Similarity
Traditionally, courts have used a "factor" approach in deter-
mining whether there is "confusing similarity" between the de-
"
8 See 3 CALLMAN" § 66.1.
"q73 N.C. 310 (1875).
122 N.C. 699, 30 S.E. 304 (1898).See Zagier v. Zagier, 167 N.C. 616, 83 S.E. 913 (1914).
19681
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fendant's mark or name and the plaintiff's. 32 Although the only
case in North Carolina which appears to have reached this specific
issue made only a cursory analysis of the question, in all probability
North Carolina would be in accord with the traditional approach.
In Blackwell33 the court concluded that "genuine" was dissimilar
enough from "original" to preclude confusion; and that since the
plaintiff used the whole figure of a bull while the defendant used
only the head and both parties placed their respective names on
their products, there had been a sufficient "set off."
North Carolina regards the prospective purchaser as "reasonably
intelligent" and thus capable of making some distinctions.8 4 As to
intent, the cases indicate some confusion. Although the Blackwell
court said that "it would seem to be immaterial whether an infring-
ing trademark is adopted by fraud or mistake, for the injury is
the same," 5 dictum in Charcoal Steak House v. Staley noted that
the evidence did not indicate any bad faith or intent to deceive
on the part of the defendant, thus in effect implying that while
good intentions will not help a defendant who adopts an infringing
mark or name, bad intentions will aid the plaintiff's cause. In an
analogous situation it has been noted that a malicious purpose to
injure was not required for an action of unfair competition because
of the presumption that "every one must be understood to have
intended to do and abide by that which is the natural and probable
conduct [sic] of his act deliberately done."8
" The Restatement takes the following factors into consideration:
In determining whether the actor's designation is confusingly similar
to the other's trade-mark or trade name, the following factors are im-
portant:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-
mark or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods
or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938). See generally 3 CALLMANN §§ 80
to -82.5.
' 73 N.C. 310 (1875).3 I1d.
'
5 1d. at 313.




Statutory Regulation of Trademarks
The 1967 General Assembly revised the statute relating to trade-
marks." Since the new article provides that "[n]othing herein
shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in
marks acquired in good faith at any time at common law," 8 the
common law is still viable. This follows the usual North Carolina
policy that statutory regulation of trademarks does not abrogate
the common law.89 Reflecting the common law, a trademark is
defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or
sold by him and to distinguish them from goods made or sold by
others."4 A "service mark" is the term used where services, and
not commodities, are in question.41
The statute defines registrability by listing marks which cannot
be registered. 42 The most significant provision is merely a codifi-
cation of the common law rule prohibiting protection of a descrip-
tive, geographical, or personal mark unless it could be shown to have
acquired secondary meaning.43 Presumptively, the word "distinc-
tive" in the statute has essentially the same meaning as common
law "secondary meaning." Five years' continuous use preceding
registration is considered as evidence of the mark becoming "distinc-
tive." 44 Nor can a mark be registered if it is "likely . . . to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive" another mark previously regis-
tered or used in this state.45 Registration is deemed effective for
ten years and is renewable.4 6
Statutory infringement occurs when one uses a copy or colorable
imitation in selling or advertising his goods which is likely "to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin
of such goods or services ;" or uses such copy on labels, wrappings,
or advertising in the intended sale of his good in this state.47 Under
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 80-1 to -14 (Supp. 1967).
'
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-13 (Supp. 1967).
"See Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844
(W.D.N.C. 1962).
"0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-1(f) (Supp. 1967).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-1(e) (Supp. 1967).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2 (Supp. 1967).
"'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2(5) (Supp. 1967).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2(5) (Supp. 1967).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2(6) (Supp. 1967).
'
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-5 (Supp. 1967).
"N.C, GEN. STAT. § 80-11 (Supp. 1967).
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a strict interpretation of this clause, the meaning of "source of
origin" would doubtless exclude from coverage the concept of dilu-
tion which does not cause immediate or even remote confusion as
to the source of origin. Similar language under the Lanham Act-
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"-has
been interpreted to exclude dilution. 8 Although North Carolina
has not decided whether its common law allows a cause of action
for dilution, it is probable that the better argument for such coverage
should be based on the common law rather than North Carolina's
statute requiring confusion as to origin. Thus, upon superficial
analysis, the statute might be less inclusive than common law pro-
tection of trademarks.4 9
Unlike the Lanham Act, 50 North Carolina's statute does not
speak in terms of giving the registrant a prima facie case for trade-
mark validity (thus shifting the burden to the defendant) or con-
structive notice to the defendant; arguably, however, its effect will
be the same. By definition, once a trademark is registered it pre-
sumptively does not infringe an already existing trademark, this
being one of the requisities for registration; thus, the defendant
most likely would have the burden of showing that his trademark
was superior to the registrant's. Otherwise, there would seem to
be little reason for the statute. Of course, the registrant-plaintiff
would still have the burden of showing that his registered trade-
mark had been infringed by the defendant, but the basis of his
action-the validity of his own trademark-is clear unless the de-
fendant can upset it.
However, the absence of statutory language giving the registrant
a prima facie case or constructive notice of his claim may indicate
legislative intent that the registrant bear the traditional burdens,
i.e., show that he has prior use of a technical trademark or secondary
,' See Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd on other grounds, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963).
'" There is conflicting opinion as to the status of common law dilution.
Callmann notes that dilution has found little favor in American courts since
the doctrine of "passing off" is so firmly ingrained that it cannot be divorced
from the doctrine of confusion. 3 CALLMANN § 84.2 at 1645. But others
contend the doctrine is finding acceptance with more courts, especially where
the plaintiff's mark or name is a celebrated one or is highly distinctive. See
Day, State Anti-Dilution Without A Statute, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 590, 592
(1964). However, most states which have accepted dilution have done so by
statute. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c) (1963); GA. CODE
ANN. § 106-115 (1956).
"°See 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1151 (1964).
[Vol. 46
UNFAIR COMPETITION
meaning ("distinctiveness"). Since the proceeding for registration
is ex parte and no provision is made for other claimants to come
in, it is not at all clear that traditional burdens should be shifted.
Specifically, while the statute says that five years' continuous use
preceding registration is evidence of the mark becoming distinctive
with reference to proof of the validity of a non-technical trademark,
it does not speak in terms of what effect registration has on tech-
nical trademarks. Arguably, therefore, the lack of any language
in regard to the latter and the fact that five years' use is only evi-
dence of distinctiveness suggest that the defendant should not have
the burden of proving prior use or secondary meaning, that burden
remaining on the registrant who is suing for infringement. This
could be the reason the Lanham Act contained such express pro-
visions.
The remedies provided by the North Carolina statute are cumula-
tive. As with the common law, the registrant whose mark has been
infringed may obtain an injunction and recover profits and damages
resulting from wrongful use.5 The statute also gives the court
the power to destroy the copies or imitations used by the defendant.5"
If the court gives an injunction and/or orders any payment by
the defendant, it "shall require the defendants to pay to said owner
a penalty" of from two hundred to a thousand dollars.5" The civil
remedies do not affect the criminal law relating to the defendant's
conduct.54
IMITATION OF THE COMPETITOR'S PRODUCT AND ITS APPEARANCE
Imitation of a competitor's product or its appearance concerns
the most basic problem of unfair competition-"passing off." 5 The
exact limitations of this tort are unclear, but as a general proposition
imitation of the competitor's product may be unfair competition
if the copied aspects of the product have acquired secondary mean-
ing or serve to associate that product with that competitor.5" Thus,




See generally Comment, Developments in the Law of Competitive
Torts, 77 HAiV. L. REv. 888, 908-23 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]; 1 Nims §§ 116-40.
" See 1 Nims § 134a,
1968]
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the problem is quite analogous to trademark and trade name in-
fringement. 57
Broad language, typical of most of the law of unfair competi-
tion, is also a characteristic of this tort. Yellow Cab Company v.
Creasman"' is representative. There the plaintiff alleged that before
it came to Asheville no one had used the color yellow on cabs. But
the defendant, who had earlier turned down an opportunity to begin
the Yellow Cab service in Asheville, began operating two cabs which
had yellow bodies with black hoods, fenders, and tops which were very
similar to the plaintiff's cabs. Plaintiff alleged it had built up good
will and that its cabs came to be identified by their particular coloring
and appearance. In upholding a preliminary restraining order, the
court said that a manufacturer of a business could adopt and use
a name, symbol, or device designed to designate and identify his
product, and when by care and diligence the quality of his goods
or services had acquired a patronage and good will of substantial
value it would be protected from unfair competition of a rival who
adopts such sign or symbol in apparent imitation as will likely mis-
lead customers and the public as to the identity of the goods or
service sold. The court then cited specific cases protecting the Yel-
low Cab Company from this kind of imitation. As to the defense
imposed that yellow was a common color which could not be ap-
propriated, the court avoided the issue and remanded the cause
for the final hearing.
A better reasoned opinion concerning imitation is Schmidt Man-
7 As pointed out in footnote 27 supra, the plaintiff is afforded immediate
protection if he has a technical mark, and subsequent protection of a non-
technical mark if he can show secondary meaning. In regard to copying of
a competitor's product, the traditional view allows copying of functional
features, whatever view the court may take as to what "functional" means.
If the functional feature had acquired secondary meaning, the only protection
afforded the plaintiff would be that the defendant distinguish his product
from the plaintiff's by use of a label, mark, name, or otherwise. The copying
of non-functional features is in the first instance prohibited on the ground
that the plaintiff had already acquired something similar to secondary mean-
ing in this non-functional part. See 1 Nims §§ 34, 34a. Determining what is
functional or non-functional is the headache of this tort. The courts have
come to any number of inconsistent results. Generally, a feature may be
functional if it contributes to economy in manufacturing, makes the product
of which it is a part durable, useful, or effective. It is non-functional if
nothing of substantial value in the good is lost when the feature in question
is omitted. What classification an aesthetic feature is given is much in
dispute. See 3 REsTATEmENo F ToRTs § 742 and comments (1938); Note,
64 COLUm L. REv. 544 (1964).
185 N.C. 551, 117 S.E. 787 (1923).
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ufacturing Company v. Sherrill Industries, Incorporated.9 The
federal district court was both more specific and more analytical in
its use of the traditional common law concepts. The plaintiff was
the manufacturer of various textile loom products, using a high
molecular weight polyethylene plastic trademarked "Polydur" as
its component element. The plaintiff's product was green in color
and came to be identified because of the plaintiff's personal selling,
advertising, overcoming of industry suspicion of plastics as a com-
ponent for loom parts, and the use of green as the color of its
product. The defendants manufactured similar products, using as
its component element the trademark "Hi-Moly." The defendants
had used all of the colors other manufacturers had used before
finally adopting the color green for its product. The court denied
the plaintiff relief. The plaintiff's contention was that it had ac-
quired, if not a secondary meaning in the color, at least some distinc-
tiveness in its product because of the color. The court examined
Yellow Cab, however, and concluded that it could be distinguished
because the issue in Yellow Cab was brought up on a preliminary
restraining order and there was no actual confusion here as in
Yellow Cab since the defendant had its trademark on its product.
Even if the Yellow Cab case stood for the proposition that one
could acquire a secondary meaning in a color, the court failed to
see how the plaintiff had shown this, pointing out that purchasers
merely regarded the green color as signifying a good product and
not necessarily signifying that it came from the plaintiff. Further-
more, the court in Schmidt went on to point out that even if the
plaintiff had acquired secondary meaning, the remedy would only
require the defendant to distinguish his product from the plaintiff's,
which was what the trademark already on the defendant's product
in fact did.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on
Yellow Cab, although the holding in Schmidt seems to remain good
law. In Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Company0 and Comp-
"249 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
376 U.S. 225 (1964). In Sears, Sears, Roebuck and Co. copied
Stiffel's pole lamp and marketed it. There was evidence of confusion in the
market. The United States Supreme Court reversed the finding below that
Sears had violated state unfair competition laws. The Supreme Court's
reasoning was that the dominant federal policy in regard to patents and
copyrights would be thwarted if state unfair competition law could prevent
the copying of an article not patentable or the copying of something not
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co Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting, Incorporated"' the Supreme
Court preempted much state unfair competition law regarding imi-
tation. Specifically, the cases held that state unfair competition law
cannot enjoin the copying and selling of unpatented or uncopy-
righted products even if the copied features had acquired a "sec-
ondary meaning," there was confusion present as to the source
of the goods, or the copied features were "non-functional" and
thus easily differentiated by the defendant. The Supreme Court
in effect swept away "the whole body of decisional law that, with
respect to product imitation, struggled with questions of function-
ality."62 Thus, the common law distinction between functional and
non-functional features, whereby protection was given functional
features only if they had acquired secondary meaning and immediate
protection was given non-functional features, was removed as a
judicial problem. Consequently, courts will no longer have to grapple
with questions such as whether the neck of a bottle or the leg of
a chair is functional or non-functional.
Since Yellow Cab was probably indicative of this functional-
non-functional approach, at least that aspect of Yellow Cab's prop-
osition has been removed. Since Schmidt did not afford protection
against imitation and in fact cited Sears and Compco, it is still effec-
copyrightable. While the result of state protection would be a perpetual
monopoly, federal protection is limited to a term of years. The Court
concluded by holding that unless the article in question were patented
or copyrighted, state unfair competition law could not prevent the
copying of it. The Court, however, would still allow states to prevent con-
fusion caused by labeling, imitation of dress and appearance, and trademark
infringement.
01376 U.S. 234 (1964). In Compco the defendant copied the plaintiff's
fluorescent lighting fixture. The court below had found both "likelihood of
confusion" and actual confusion. Plaintiff was granted relief. The Supreme
Court reversed. Although the Court intimated that the defendant had labeled
its lighting fixture and thus prevented confusion, it held that state unfair
competition law could not prevent copying if there was no patent or copy-
right present. Even if the configuration of the plaintiff's had acquired,
like a trademark, secondary meaning, it could be copied at will by the public
unless patented. Again, the state law of unfair competition was free to
prevent confusion whenever the defendant copied labels, trademarks, or
the dress and appearance of the plaintiff's product.
6 Brown, Product Simulation, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1216, 1221 (1964).
Courts had come to any number of inconsistent results in attempting to
differentiate the functional from the non-functional features of a product.
As pointed out in footnote 57 supra the distinction at common law had
significant consequences regarding the degree of proof and the relief afforded.
The Supreme Court evidently wanted to do away with this troublesome




tive. However, the Court in Sears left the states free to "protect
businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress
in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such
markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of the
goods.6" The Supreme Court did not preempt state unfair com-
petition law protecting a businessman's good will which he had built
up through identification. Only if the question was the copying of
the product itself would federal law of patent and copyright con-
trol. Thus, the decision should not be considered applicable to the
question of distinctive packaging and dress of goods.6 4 Consequent-
ly, if the plaintiff in Yellow Cab could show that the distinctive
configuration and coloration were merely aspects of dress of his
service used for customer identification, then state law of unfair
competition would be able to afford relief since he had shown the
traditional elements for a good cause of action.
No attempt has been made toward an intensive analysis of Sears
and Compco and their effects on state law of unfair competition.
The problems they create have not as yet been settled and are beyond
the scope of this comment.6 5 But the questions created by these de-
cisions should be born in mind whenever the problem of copying
and state unfair competition law are at hand.
INTERFERENCE WITH A COMPETITORS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
While the good will which a businessman has built up through
trademark, trade name, or product differentiation is considered
more or less an intangible property interest, the protection usually
given a businessman who has had his contractual relationships
interfered with has approached the protection given for tangible
property and personal security.6 6 The wrong here is unlike that
of "passing off" because the interference is not with some prospec-
tive advantage but with a realized advantage. Thus, protection is
easier to justify and should be more readily afforded. 7
03 376 U.S. at 232.
" See Leeds, Product Sinulation, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1179, 1180 (1964).
" For a more detailed consideration of this problem, see Treece, Patent
Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
80 (1964); Treece, Protectibility of Product Differentiation: Is ard Ought
Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 1019 (1964); Unfair Competition After
Sears and Compco, 15 COPYRIGHT L. Syt. 1 (1967) ; Comment, Unfair Con-
petition Protection After Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 101 (1965).
"See Developments 959.
ITSee generally 2 CALLMANN §§ 32-35.2; 1 NIms §§ 162-184; PROSSER,
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The basic requirements for an action for inducing breach of
contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plain-
tiff and a third party which the defendant, (2) with knowledge
of the contract and (3) without legal justification, (4) intentionally
induces the third party not to perform, (5) causing theplaintiff
damage. 8 While there is some conflict in decisions in North Caro-
lina, it seems the better and more persuasive position that North
Carolina allows such an action. 9
The most significant problem under North Carolina decisions
in this area concerns the question of justification. Some cases have
stated that competition is a justification and therefore a defense
to an action for inducing breach of contract.70 This is contra to
the general rule.71 Since justification is established only when the
defendant is protecting an interest equal in value to the plaintiff's, 2
presumptively the defendant should fail in his defense because the
plaintiff's contractual rights are superior to the defendant's pros-
pective advantage.
However, it is suggested that a closer analysis of the cases will
indicate that, at a minimum, North Carolina does not consider com-
petition a justification in all situations. In Bryant v. Barber78 the
plaintiff alleged that he had a contract with various persons to
transport them to and from Camp Lejeune and that the defendants
induced them to breach their contract with the plaintiff and ride
TORTS § 128 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Harper, Inter-
ference With Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 873 (1953); Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 H.Av. L. REv. 663 (1923); 32 N.C.L. REv.
110 (1953); Note, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 1406 (1966).
88 Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
08 Decisions expressing doubt are Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d
9 (1945) ; Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945) ; Holder
v. Atlantic Joint-Stock Land Bank, 208 N.C. 38, 178, S.E. 861 (1935); El-
vington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N.C. 515, 132 S.E. 274 (1926);
Swain v. Johnson, 151 N.C. 93, 65 S.E. 619 (1909); Biggers v. Matthews,
147 N.C. 299, 61 S.E. 55 (1908). A more recent case came to the conclusion
that North Carolina did allow the action, Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667,
84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). Older authority for allowing the action are Jones v.
Stanly, 76 N.C. 355 (1877) and Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874)
(purportedly the first case to recognize the action in North Carolina; see 32
N.C.L. REv. 110 (1953)).
R.g., Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954); Bruton
v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9 (1945); Swain v. Johnson, 151 N.C.
93, 65 S.E. 619 (1909).
'2 CALLMANN § 33; PROSSER § 123 at 970.02See PROSSER § 123 at 967-970.
,8237 N.C. 480, 75 S.E.2d 410 (1953).
[Vol. 46
UNFAIR COMPETITION
with defendants instead. On appeal the Supreme Court of North
Carolina sustained the trial court's continuance of the temporary
restraining order. Similarly, Winston v. Williams & McKeithan
Lumber Company74 held that competition was no justification where
the plaintiff alleged that he had a contract with owners of land for
its sale and the defendant induced the owner to sell to him.
The case of Bruton v. Smith75 points out a possible distinction
between the situation where the defendant through fraud or threats
of physical force prevents the willing promisor from performing
and where the defendant induces the breach by giving the promisor-
third party a more attractive offer. The Bruton case involved the
same factual situation as Winston, but the court in Bruton held that
competition was a valid defense. Although both Winston and
Bruton involved a breach induced by a more attractive proposal, the
latter case could stand for the proposition that that competition
is a justification where the breach is persuasively induced. But it
is doubtful if the court intended such a result since the Winston
case, coming after Bruton, did not allude to such a proposition.7"
It is suggested that the conflict of authority on this point was due to
carelessness on the part of the court and, therefore, the better posi-
tion would be one that reaches the soundest result. On this basis,
the manner in which the defendant causes the breach should be
immaterial. 77 No matter how the breach is induced, the plaintiff's
realized expectations have been interfered with. In the interest of
maintaining a level of honesty and fair dealings between competitors
and of protecting secured interests, the manner in which the breach
was procured should be irrelevant to the issue of competition as a
justification, although it might be relevant to the issue of damages.
Perhaps the clearest North Carolina case indicating that compe-
227 N.C. 339, 42 S.E.2d 218 (1947).
' 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9 (1945).
As the concurring opinion in Bruton points out, the existing rule re-
garding contracts for the sale of real property required the contract to be
registered before it would be given protection in an action of this sort. Thus,
the concurring opinion would deny relief on this ground, specifically pointing
out that a good cause of action would lie for inducing the breach of the
contract in the case. 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9 (1945) (concurring opinion).
But it must be noted that the concurring justice did not have the defense of
justification in mind. Justification is distinguishable from a valid cause of
action in that a plaintiff may have a good cause but will be denied relief
because the defendant is justified.
"'See 2 CALLY!ANN § 34.3.
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tition is not a justification is Sineath v. Katgis.71 The plaintiff
bought a laundry and dry-cleaning establishment from the owner-
defendant. In the sales agreement, the owner-defendant agreed, as
part of the consideration for the sale, not to engage in the same
occupation for a period of fifteen years within a particular county.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached his covenant not to
compete79 by running a laundry with other defendants who aided and
assisted the owner-defendant in its establishment. Not mentioning
competition as a possible justification, the court held that "a stranger
to the covenant (not to compete) may properly be enjoined from
aiding the covenantor in violating his covenant or receiving any
benefit therefrom."80 Because the defendants participating in caus-
ing the breach knew of the owner-defendant's covenant not to com-
pete, they were properly enjoinable. Since the contract in question
was clearly anti-competitive, it gave the court an excellent oppor-
tunity to state that competition was a justification for inducing a
breach of contract. But no mention of this was made by the court.
Inferentially, one can argue that because the court missed its best
opportunity to elevate the doctrine of competition as a justification
for inducing breach of contract, statements and holdings expressing
this view must not be given too much weight.
The Sineath case, however, is subject to criticism. While log-
ically competition should not be a justification for inducing a breach
of contract, it is suggested that certain contracts be denied enforce-
ment in order to promote competition. Thus, a breach can be in-
duced without making the defendant liable since the contract was
void in the first place. In the Sineath case the contract was clearly
anti-competitive and arguably could have been denied enforcement
on the grounds that it was a violation of the state's anti-monopoly
laws. Or validity could have been denied under North Carolina's
traditional "reasonableness" test regarding contracts not to com-
pete. In any event, contracts which tend to monopolize or give rise
to anti-competitive market conditions should be denied enforcement,
thus removing any liability a competitor might incur in inducing
"8218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.2d 671 (1941).
" On the subject of covenants not to compete in North Carolina, see
Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 395 (1960).
218 N.C. 740, 755, 12 S.E.2d 671, 681 (1941). Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. O'Hanlon, 243 N.C. 457, 91 S.E.2d 222 (1956) and Wilson Radio




their breach. Contracts which are only part of ordinary business
activity should be protected from third-party interference."'
In summary, while North Carolina has recognized a cause of
action for inducing breach of contract and has held that competition
is not a justification, some decisions present an inconsistent line of
authority. These cases are inconsistent with the modem view af-
fording protection for both interference with prospective advantage
and interference with contractual relations."2 A position which af-
"'A recent example of this suggested dichotomy arose in a suit by a
telephone company to restrain the defendants from distributing plastic tele-
phone directory covers to customers of the telephone company. The telephone
company alleged the defendants were interfering with its contractual relations,
as well as engaging in unfair competition. The federal district court, sitting
in diversity with no North Carolina precedent, held that the telephone com-
pany's tariff filed with the North Carolina Utilities Commission, prohibiting
the use of covers on the phone book, constituted a contract between the
telephone company and its customers. Without really going into an analysis
of this contract, the court held it was not an "unreasonable extension of the
telephone monopoly" and that defendants' attempts to distribute covers was
tortious conduct. Citizens Tel. Co. v. Tel. Service Co., Inc., 214 F. Supp.
627 (W.D.N.C. 1963). Although the case may be criticized for its lack of
analysis concerning the contract, and its apparent unconcern that it was in
fact extending the telephone company's monopoly, it can be rationalized
on grounds that this directory service was so integral a part of the general
telephone service that it should be controlled by public utility authorities.
" An example of North Carolina's confusion and variance from modern
authority is found in Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647
(1945). The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, had patented an attach-
ment for hosiery machines and had assigned the employer an interest in
the patent. Whenever the plaintiff attempted to contract with other parties
for the use of this attachment, the defendant-employer would threaten suit
against those with whom the plaintiff negotiated, thus preventing the plain-
tiff from entering into contracts. While the court allowed the plaintiff a
remedy for the defendant's interference with the plaintiff's prospective
advantage, i.e. possibility of making contracts, the court was somewhat
fuzzy in regard to the plaintiff's action for inducing a breach of contract.
It said that the plaintiff could have a remedy if the defendant "maliciously"
procured a breach of contract with intent to injure plaintiff or gain some-
thing from the plaintiff, but could not have a remedy if the defendant induced
the breach of a "single contract" since the plaintiff could sue on the contract
itself. Whether the court intended to put significance on the defendant's
intention when he induced the breach or on the fact that only one breach
was induced is unclear since there was nothing else going to this issue. Of
course, all this discussion is dicta and its relevance in future litigation is
questionable, but it is suggested that the intent of the defendant should be
irrelevant because the plaintiff has been wronged and should be given a
remedy. Furthermore, the modern trend seems to be away from the super-
ficial analysis usually given the nebulous concept of intent. As to the pos-
sibility that the court's basis was the fact that the plaintiff could sue on the
contract, it is suggested that the defendant should be held liable on a rationale
of keeping competitor's conduct within reasonable limits. In any event, that
the plaintiff could sue on the contract seems an untenable basis for the court
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fords relief for interference with prospective advantage but not for
interference with contractual relations is hard to maintain since the
harm is more obvious whenever contractual relations are interfered
with than when prospective advantage is denied.
DISPARAGEMENT OF PRODUCT, TITLE OR BusINESs METHODS
Disparagement is the publication of derogatory matter about
the plaintiff's title, property or business in general of a kind calcu-
lated to prevent others from dealing with the plaintiff, or to other-
wise interfere with his relations with others to his disadvantage.
8 3
The tort grew out of "slander of title" which allowed an owner of
land recovery for a defendant's interference with the owner's pros-
pective sale of his land by falsely and maliciously stating that the
owner did not have good title.8 4 Although the law of defamation
has influenced the development of this tort, 5 there are significant
differences between the two. The basic distinction is that if the
publication concerns the credit or integrity of the business, a cause
of action for defamation will lie; if it concerns the quality of the
business' product or service, a cause of action for disparagement will
lie."' Several important differences can follow from the legal classi-
fication of the cause of action: (1) a plaintiff in disparagement must
prove actual damage, while damage is presumed in defamation that
is slanderous per se or libelous; (2) a plaintiff in disparagement
to grasp since the harm is more obvious in inducing a breach than in pre-
venting the formation of a contract. Liability, if found on the question
of prospective advantage, should also be found on the question of inducing
breach of contract.
" See generally 2 CALLMANN §§ 39-47; 2 Nxms §§ 25-271; PROSSER § 122;
Developments 893-905; Comment, 7 ViLL. L. Rnv. 271 (1962).
" See Developments 893. See also footnote 88 infra.
as See PRossnm § 122 at 938-40. Although many courts have treated dis-
paragement in the same manner as libel and slander and have refused to
enjoin the publication in the interest of free speech, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has indicated it would enjoin slanderous statements affecting
the plaintiff's business
where it appears necessary for the protection of plaintiff's business and
property rights, and it is alleged that the systematic circulation of
false statements seriously affecting these rights will work irreparable
and continuing injury ....
Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 768, 772, 47 S.E.2d 297,
299 (1948). An interesting question is whether the United States Supreme
Court would equate disparagement with false advertising and therefore hold
that it was non-protected commercial speech or with defamation and pro-
tected under some rationale of free speech analogous to New York Times




must affirmatively prove the falsity of the defendant's statement
while there is a presumption of falsity in personal slander; and (3)
a plaintiff in disparagement must show "malice" which is not re-
quired in defamation."
If disparagement did grow out of "slander of title," it has not
grown very much in North Carolina. Two early North Carolina
cases stand for the proposition that a cause of action lies for "slan-
dering title."88 They outline the conventional elements which the
plaintiff must show for a good cause of action. The limit of the
growth of this tort in North Carolina appears to be Carolina
Aniline & Extract Company v. Ray.8" The plaintiff had sold
its plant to the defendant, bought new equipment and began opera-
tions elsewhere. The defendant wrote letters to plaintiff's customers
explaining the purchase and stating that it would "manufacture
identically the same products under our [defendant's] trade names."'
The defendant went on to compare prices and products and listed
its lower prices on each comparison. At trial the plaintiff was
not allowed to put in evidence that because it had a new plant
with new equipment its goods were superior to the defendant's.
On appeal, the court held that the trial court should have allowed
the evidence in order to determine if the products were identical.
If they were not, the defendant would be guilty of unfair competi-
tion. Evidently the plaintiff was required to show falsity and actual
damage. The problem of showing "malice" was not mentioned.
The rationale behind Carolina Aniline is unclear. But it is sug-
gested that it conforms to two of the traditional reasons for al-
lowing a cause of action in unfair competition-maintaining notions
of fair play within the competitive framework and protecting the
public. Such a rationale seems implicit since the court said that
unfair competition was not confined to the "passing off" situation,
but existed whenever the public "is likely to be deceived." 1 Thus,
because the defendant was making statements of opinion in an at-
tempt to induce customers away from the plaintiff, the defendant
"' PROSSER § 122 at 943-45; Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E.
109 (1897).
" Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897) and McElwee
v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886) (concerning slander of title tG a trade-
mark).
8'221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
00 Id. at 271, 20 S.E.2d at 60 (1942).
"Id. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61 (1942).
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should be required to act in good faith and make truthful state-
ments. 2 If untruthful statements were made, the public would be
deceived as to the quality of both plaintiff's and defendant's goods-
the latter being thought of as being equal to the plaintiff's when they
were not, the former being thought of as only equal to the de-
fendant's when they were in fact superior. Thus, it is clear that the
plaintiff could suffer damage from the comparison if the state-
ment were untrue.
One could analyze the case from the perspective of false ad-
vertising, which occurs whenever a competitor makes a false state-
ment concerning his own goods. Although a false statement may
by implication impugn the competitor's goods, the mere diversion
of trade alone is sufficient for this action. The common law remedy
for false advertising is not very satisfactory. Relief was initially
granted only if the plaintiff could show the loss of particular cus-
tomers who bought the defendant's product assuming it was the
plaintiff's." Subsequent decisions have granted the plaintiff relief
where he could show that his goods were of the same quality as the
defendant's and were the only goods in the market or where the
plaintiffs were a "consolidated monopoly." 5 Thus, in most circum-
stances, the plaintiff would be well advised to concentrate on dis-
paragement rather than false advertising for his relief.
Most questions involved in disparagement have not been an-
swered in North Carolina. As a matter of fact, the court in the
"See 2 CALLMfANN § 42.1.
"On the subject of false advertising, see generally Developments at
905-908; See also Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J.
22 (1929). Note, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 1019 (1956).
" See American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th
Cir. 1900).
"See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). But compare Learned
Hand's dissent in California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc.,
162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947) where a class suit was purportedly brought by
the plaintiffs on behalf of all manufacturers and dealers of wearing apparel
in California. While the majority held that a particular loss could not be
shown by these plaintiffs, relying on Ely-Norris, Hand thought that some
of the manufacturers and dealers in California were injured by the New
York corporate defendants' use of the word "California" in their advertising.
Thus, Judge Hand would have extended a remedy to those who possibly
might not need it rather than deny it to those who did need it. Where it
has been more certain that the plaintiffs were all the producers in the market
in question, thus making them a "consolidated monopoly," relief has been
granted, Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
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cases above did not actually label the action by any of the traditional
phrases such as disparagement or injurious falsehood. But it is
suggested that North Carolina has accepted the basic concept.
Three traditional problem areas have appeared in other juris-
dictions. (1) To what extent is the defendant privileged to disparage
his competitor's goods? The general understanding is thai dis-
paragement is subject to all the privileges and defenses a defendant
would have in a case of personal defamation or other interferences
with economic relations. Thus, some courts would allow the de-
fendant to compare his goods with the plaintiff's .as long as the de-
fendant did not make any specific unfavorable reference to the
plaintiff's goods. 6 Under the Ray case, it is doubtful if North
Carolina would allow such "boasting" by the defendant. (2) As-
suming malice is a requisite for this action, what is a sufficient show-
ing of malice? Is it enough that the plaintiff can show that the
defendant acted without justification or privilege, thus imposing
strict liability on the defendant for innocent falsehood as in defama-
tion ? Logically, since a valid privilege or justification absolves
the defendant of liability notwithstanding any kind of "malice"
the defendant might have, the issue of malice properly arises only
where the court is not concerned with privilege or justification. In
this context, only where the defendant has acted out of ill will or
with intent to injure the plaintiff has a sufficient showing of malice
been found." (3) In regard to damages, what kind of proof is
required of the plaintiff ? The more conservative view requires that
the plaintiff show loss of particular customers. The more modern
approach requires the plaintiff to show the loss of particular cus-
tomers only when it would be reasonable to place such a burden on
the plaintiff."9 In the Ray case for example, the plaintiff might be
required to show the loss of particular customers since the plaintiff
had an established trade with certain customers with whom the de-
fendant interfered and plaintiff could therefore show their loss.
Although most of the issues regarding disparagement are un-
resolved in North Carolina, a plaintiff might be well advised to
See PROSSER § 122 at 949.
The affirmative answer to this question has been given by Jeremiah
Smith in his famous article, Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLU.
L. REv. 12, 121 (1913).
8 See PROSSER § 122 at 944-45.
00 Id at 945-47.
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consider a cause of action for defamation. 100 Even if the torts of
disparagement and defamation are considered distinct, both can
arise in a competitive situation. For example, in Badame v.
Lampke'01 a competitor of the plaintiff told the plaintiff's customer
that the plaintiff engaged in "shady deals." The court followed the
per se rule of liability for slanderous statements reflecting on the
plaintiff's trade or profession, thus permitting recovery without
proof of special damage.
Although North Carolina has not resolved a particular fact
situation by making a distinction between defamation and disparage-
ment, the label given the plaintiff's cause may have serious conse-
quences regarding the degree of proof required and damages. Be-
cause "it is not always easy to distinguish between personal defama-
tion of the plaintiff and disparagement of his property or busi-
ness, '' 02 as where the business is a sole proprietorship, and because
there is probably as much a problem proving damages in one situa-
tion as in the other, it has been suggested that the distinc-
tion between these two torts is unsatisfactory.10 3 It is thus hoped
that future North Carolina law will not take the traditional common
law approach of analysis by pigeon hole, but will attempt to adjust
the conflicting claims of competitors by sound analysis of their
interests.
MISAPPROPRIATION OF A COMPETITOR'S VALUES
The doctrine of misappropriation concerns the protection of
intangibles having potential commercial value. Since commercial
intangibles are myriad, presumptively this doctrine would be in-
clusive of most of the law of unfair competition. But technically,
the doctrine has a specified and more narrow coverage:
When considering those commercial values which are protected
by statute, such as trade-marks, patents, copyrights, or those
which are misappropriated by commonly recognized unfair prac-
tices, such as breach of contract or trust in trade secret cases,
the courts have not had particular difficulty. But it is otherwise
100 North Carolina allows, as do most states, a corporation to sue in
defamation for statements reflecting on its credit, good will, and relations
with its employees. R. H-. Boulingny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca, 270 N.C. 160, 168, 154, S.E.2d 344, 352 (1967).1242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).




when the absence of a statutory or common-law right is used as
a cloak for the misappropriation of business values; such as is the
case in the appropriation of advertising devices, designs or busi-
nesg systems. 04
Those intangibles not identified with either statutory or tradi-
tional common law protection have been protected under the com-
mon law concept of misappropriation.' The doctrine had its be-
ginnings around the turn of the century,' reaching its high water
mark in International News Service v. Associated Press.0 7 There
the defendant was systematically copying Associated Press's news
bulletins from bulletin boards and early editions of newspapers
carrying the Associated Press service. The defendant sold this news
to its own customers, enabling it to compete with Associated Press
in later time zones. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
injunction of the trial court prohibiting the copying "until its com-
mercial value as news to the complainant and all its members had
passed away."' 8
To the defendant's argument that, once published, the news be-
came public property, the court replied:
The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights
of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as be-
tween themselves.... In doing this defendant, by its very act,
admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by com-
plainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of
labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for
money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as
its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by
disposing of it to newspapers -that are competitors of complainant's
members is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have
sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an un-
authorized interference with the normal operation of com-
plainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit
,1 CALL-MANN § 8.3. See generally 2 CALLMANN §§ 51-62.3; Callmann,
He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unist Enrichment in the Law
of Unfair Competition, 55 HARv. L. REv. 595 (1942); Sell, The Doctrine
of Misappropriation in, Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REv. 483 (1958);
Developments at 932-59; Note, 6 SypA. L. Rxv. 317 (1955).
.0. Developments 933.
100 E.g., Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Davis, 209 F. 917 (S.D.Ohio 1913); Fono-
tipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); F.W. Dodge Co. v.
Construction Infor. Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903).
17248 U.S. 215 (1918).
108 Id. at 245.
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from those who have earned it to those who have not; with spe-
cial advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact
that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering
the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity
ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competi-
tion in business. 10 9
In effect, the court expanded the concept of unfair competition
beyond "passing" or "palming off" to the theory of unjust enrich-
ment.110 The court disregarded the traditional grounds upon which
unfair competition gave relief: where the defendant was "passing
off" or did acts which the court considered unfair under the tradi-
tional concepts of fraud and force. More than any case before it,
recognition was given to the concept that unfair competition is based
on a relationship between competitors instead of some general prop-
erty right."' Thus, the case altered unfair competition by placing
particular emphasis on "unfairness" and affording relief unavailable
by other legal means." 2
The genius of the decision is also its handicap. Because it is so
innovative and unlimited," 3 many courts have accepted it only
grudgingly" 4 or rejected it altogether."' It would appear that either
the courts are unwilling to get into the problem of adjusting interests
or are unable to do so because they are still struggling with an out-
moded analysis based on a traditional and very limited view of
property."
But where the concept has been followed, four general theories
of protection have appeared." 7 Some courts base protection in
109 Id. at 239-240.
110 Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrich-
ment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REv. 595, 597 (1942).
111 Id.
112Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11
VAND. L. REv. 483, 486 (1958).
... See Note, 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 1419 (1934).
"' E.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whitman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d
279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Desclee & Cie., S.A.
v. Nemmers, 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
.. E.g., Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt &
Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941)(Illinois law); Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198
(D. Mass. 1942) (Massachusetts law).
11 See Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition,
11 VAxD. L. REv. 483, 498 (1958).
"This analysis is found in Developments 935-37.
tWol. 46
UNFAIR COMPETITION
terms of property rights, but this is a circular position since prop-
erty rights can only result from legal protection. Because many ir-
relevant connotations arise with the term "property," this view is
probably misleading in the misappropriation area. A second group
of courts rationalizes the protection on the basis of contract rights
whenever possible.1 ' A third group of cases seems to grant pro-
tection on the basis of the general equitable-moral principle that
"one should not reap where he has not sown." This approach, being
vague and somewhat arbitrary, can explain why other courts have
not been disposed to accept the doctrine. Finally, some decisions
can be rationalized on the ground that the court is considering the
economic impact of the defendant's actions on both the plaintiff and
society in general. These courts try, although not expressly, to
balance the defendant's interest in free access against the plaintiff's
interest in having enough protection so that he can and will con-
tinue to invest in and play the competitive game.
The application of the doctrine has resulted in groupings of
various kinds: the broadcasting cases, dress design cases, product
design cases, phonograph cases, printing cases and business organi-
zation cases." 9 Only the phonograph type case seems to have arisen
in North Carolina.
In Waring v. Dunlea,2 ° a diversity action in federal district
court, Fred Waring sought to enjoin defendant-radio station from
playing his recordings. On the record was the notice that it was to be
used only on the Ford Motor Program and only by a distributee
of Waring. The defendant radio station was not a distributee and
did not confine its broadcast to the Ford Motor Program. The court
answered in the affirmative its own question as to whether the
plaintiff had a "distinct and separable property right" in his unique
rendition of music. The court thought the modern trend was toward
expanding personal property rights. As the plaintiff's performance
was not considered a publication, the court gave protection.
Although the court seemed to be fenced in by the traditional
11 E.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho
1962), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
11 Regarding the respective groupings, "[R]elief is almost always granted
in news cases resembling INS, and often in cases involving broadcasting,
records and business organizations. Protection is less often afforded to
designs not safeguarded by statute, and almost never extended to highly
abstract concepts." Developtnents 937.
12026 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939).
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approach toward competition since it made reference to property
interests, it also discussed what it considered to be the best public
policy: protection of the individual artist and his restrictive
covenants in order to provide a stimulus for further creation. The
court concluded that to allow the defendant to benefit from the
plaintiff's work would be an unfair trade practice, thus echoing
the equitable principal established in International News Service.
Actually, Waring v. Dunlea is only a rehash of Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station, Incorporated.2 ' The problem there
was essentially the same and the Pennsylvania court concluded that
Waring had common law rights in his performance, that there was
no public policy reason why the restriction on the records should not
be enforced, and finally, that the plaintiff was entitled to protection
from the defendant's appropriation under the rationale expressed
in International News Service.
Whether the district court in the North Carolina version of
the Waring cases was speaking of North Carolina law and whether
the pronouncements the court made are to be considered binding as
part of North Carolina's jurisprudence are now a moot questions.1 22
Just after the decision came a legislative reversal of Waring v. Dun-
lea. The statute abolished "all asserted common-law rights to
further restrict or to collect royalties on the commercial use made
of such recorded performances" and deemed that "any asserted
intangible rights" passed to the buyer of the record.12 3 In common
law terminology, the legislature in effect declared the restrictions to
be restraints on alienation or thought that the performer had lost
his rights through publication. Any value the performer had was
not based on the restrictions, but would be realized through sale of
the record.1
24
It has been suggested that in any misappropriation case the
plaintiff must not only show that the defendant is appropriating his
intangible property, but also that more public good than harm will
result from protection of this property. 25 Such a position leaves
121327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
1
" The district court did not make reference to whose law it was applying
nor did it refer to a single North Carolina case, but its decision should have
been based on North Carolina. law since Erie v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), had been decided earlier.
"N.C. Gax. STAT. § 66-28 (1965).
A 'Id.
.2 See Developments 941.
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courts free to make broad policy considerations and to come ulti-
mately to conclusions which reflect whether the court is more con-
cerned with the protection of property rights and regulation of com-
petitive behavior than with the prevention of extending protection
so far that a virtual monopoly is established. Both views have their
merit and neither should be considered as an all or nothing proposi-
tion, i.e., profection should be afforded business interests to the ex-
tent that such protection does not shade into judicial establishment
of a superior position in the competitive structure. Thus, to indicate
whether the legislative determination not to give effect to the re-
strictions placed on records is either good or bad from a policy
viewpoint does not say much because either result is somewhat
arbitrary and line-drawing. Suffice it to say that North Carolina's
legislative policy indicates it has drawn the line against protection
in favor of freer use of recordings. Since this freer use of records
has not harmed the record industry, it can be argued that public in-
terests have been served.
From another viewpoint, the legislation poses the possibility
that the common law protection of intangible property interests may
be abolished in favor of new statutory standards or by leaving the
party to protection under federal laws-patent, trademark, or copy-
right. ' In fact, the North Carolina legislation leaves the per-
former to his federal rights. Although there is some question
whether legislation can cover the variety of intangible interests pos-
sessed by businesses today, it can at least make clearer the limits
of protection and remove conflicting authority. 127
STATUTORY REGULATION OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
North Carolina's legislative approach to the regulation of busi-
ness practices has been ad hoc and lacking in overview. 'Because
the penalties provided for unfair trade in the legislative sense are
criminal and not civil, the provisions are concerned with specific
industries and are detailed as to what an unfair trade practice is.
This approach is only tangential to the focus of attention given in
this comment because the legislature is not adjusting the conflicting
interests of competitors. Rather, the legislation either provides a
2' This is basically the position taken by the United States Supreme
Court in Sears and Conipco. See footnotes 60 and 61 supra.
"' See Comment, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears ard Compco,
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 101, 152-153 (1965).
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standard of conduct supposed to keep the public from being imposed
upon or defrauded 2 ' or imposes regulations on industries clothed
with public responsibilities.' 29 Most of the legislation appears to be
only infrequently used, but an interesting question is what signifi-
cance a conviction for a statutory violation would have in a civil
action based on some notion of unfair competition.
Notwithstanding the penal approach, two provisions provide for
civil remedies. One already discussed is that concerning trade-
marks.' The other provision is the Fair Trade Act. 1 ' Of doubtful
public benefit, this exemption from the federal antitrust law allows
manufacturers to impose a minimum price below which the retailer
or wholesaler cannot sell. It is unfair competition for a person to
"willfully and knowingly" advertise, offer for sale, or sell the
product in question below the resale price established in the contract
between the manufacturer and the retailer or wholesaler.1 3 2 Any one
damaged thereby can sue for damages arising out of this breach of
contract.
33
The statute in effect eliminates much competitive behavior. This
is contrary to the position taken in both state and federal antitrust
law as well as unfair competition. Under the most rudimentary prin-
ciple of unfair competition, that which is not "unfair" is not ac-
tionable. 34 Thus, the cutting of prices, disregarding any malicious
intent to drive the competitor out of business, has long been deemed
the gist of the game played by businessmen. Take this away and
very little is left upon which to base a competitive economy.
SUMMMARY OF UNFAIR COMPETITION IN NORTH CAROLINA
The law of unfair competition in North Carolina is not unlike
that found elsewhere: it is often vague, assuming instead of analyt-
128 See N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 66-73 to -75 (1965) (detailed regulation of
the diamond industry); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 119-1 to -13 (1964) (regulating
the sale of lubricating oils, auto fuels, and other lubricants).
... See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1 to -54.13 (1965) (regulating insurance
practices); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-58 (1965) (regulation of government in
private enterprise) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.21 (1966) (prohibiting the
sale of milk below cost to injure or destroy competition); and N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 106-496 to -501 (1966) (regulation of handling of farm products).
130 See notes 37 to 48 supra.
.
31N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 to -57 (1965).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-56 (1965).1 Id.
13 See Carolina Motor Service, Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210
N.C. 36, 185 S.E. 479 (1936) where the court said in traditional language
that any loss resulting from lawful competition wa daminm abs que injuria,
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ical, but generally capable of giving a traditional form of relief.
This traditional common law approach has been the subject of well
deserved criticism in that its "pigeon hole" type of analysis prevents
the court from adjusting economic interests of competitors and so-
ciety generally. A review of North Carolina cases reveals the basic
common law approach toward unfair competition: emphasis on tra-
ditional property concepts, "passing off," and alleged elasticity of
coverage within the doctrine of unfair competition. Thus, the gen-
eral criticism made of the common law is applicable.
Furthermore, even if one can find favor with the common law
concepts, the court has not made any significant strides in improving
its analysis under the common law. The older cases seem just about
as well reasoned as the more recent ones. In most cases the court
has merely stated the rule it thought applicable without delving into
the larger interests involved. Thus, North Carolina law cannot be
classified as promoting either a policy which protects the interests of
businessmen or one giving particular concern to the establishment
of monopolies.
The court can legitimately be criticized for its failure to overrule
outdated precedent, to distinguish prior cases, and generally to
indicate just what its exact position on many matters of unfair com-
petition is. Perhaps all the ipso facto approaches and the inconsis-
tencies result from a lack of a commercial sophistication like that
found in New York or Pennsylvania. Whatever the reason, most of
the intricate problems of unfair competition have not arisen in North
Carolina. Thus, it is unclear just how the court would stand on
more than just rudimentary problems. But the North Carolina court
should not feel any restraint on its judgment, and it is hoped future
developments reflect an adjustment to competitive and market needs.
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